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COMMENTS ON WHEN GOD ISN’T GREEN
SARAH SCHINDLER

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the symposium and provide
comments about Jay Wexler’s great new book, When God Isn’t Green. Given
that Jay is both a humorist and a serious legal scholar with a penchant for taking
trips, it should come as no surprise that this book reads like a mix between a
travel guide, a humorous ethnography, and an adventure memoir. In addition to
raising important questions about conflicts between two important, competing
issues, Jay provides vivid imagery of his trips overseas. I especially appreciated
the image of Jay sitting at a bar drinking with a cat.
In this essay, I’d like to make three small points that struck me as I was
reading the book. First, I’d like to situate the book within a larger body of
scholarship about the cumulative impact of small harms. I’d then like to talk
about how big (or small) the cumulative harms that he’s addressing in the book
really are. I’ll conclude with a brief word on animal welfare.
First, with respect to cumulative harms, a number of legal scholars have
written about the fact that individuals, and their actions, cumulatively contribute
to significant environmental harms.1 In the book, Jay provides many examples
of religious practices that have negative effects on the environment. I view this
book as falling within the literature addressing what are known as
“environmentally significant individual behaviors.”2 The book fits well within
the works of Katy Kuh, Jason Czarnezki, Jim Salzman, Mike Vandenbergh,
Thaler & Sunstein and others on this point.
The idea is that, if a single person is releasing a turtle into the wild, or lighting
a bonfire, or cutting palm fronds, there likely wouldn’t be a problem (or a book),
because any harm to the environment would be de minimis. The problem comes
from the fact that large numbers of religious adherents engage in these practices.
Thus, we can’t look at these actions individually. Rather, we have to look at
them cumulatively, and when we do so, we might find that they impose harms
that have a substantial negative impact on the environment. Although we
historically have focused on large, industrial, point-source type polluters and
pollutants, some scholars have begun to acknowledge that we must also focus
on the actions of individuals that, when taken together, cause harm to the
environment.


Professor of Law and Glassman Faculty Research Scholar, University of Maine School
of Law. Thanks to Kellen Zale, Dmitry Bam, and Jason Czarnezki for helpful comments, and
to Boston University for inviting me to participate in this symposium.
1 See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, Environmental Privacy, 1 UTAH L. REV. 1, n.1 (2015).
2 Id. at 1.
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One important question that many of these scholars tackle is how to best
regulate these individual actions in order to reduce the overall harm. My
preferred framework for matching regulatory tool to harmful action is that set
forth by Lawrence Lessig, wherein he discusses four forms of regulation, or
constraints on behavior.3 These are laws or mandates, social norms, markets, and
architecture. In the book, Jay touches on some of these regulatory options by
referencing a variety of educational campaigns, bans on engaging in certain
activities, and a number of architectural, or technical, solutions. I’ll discuss these
shortly, but I want to first address the importance of the religious focus in Jay’s
book.
Here, I would like to ask Jay whether the religious practices that he describes
in the book are more akin to norms or laws. Obviously, the answer to this
question depends on the religion we are talking about, as well as the specific
religious practice at issue and the beliefs of the adherents. But the answer to that
question might help to inform the potential “solutions” to the problems that Jay
raises in the book. This is because if a given practice is more like a norm, then
an educational campaign—even one established by the government as opposed
to the religion itself—might be successfully used to change it (although,
religious norms are often sticky norms, and thus harder to change). But to the
extent a practice is more akin to a law, it would likely need to be changed from
inside the religion itself.
In the book, Jay talks about some countries’ attempts at using laws or
mandates to regulate harmful religious practices. But Jay recognizes that this
probably isn’t the best approach, and I agree. He points out that laws often have
unequal impacts. They might affect poor people more than wealthy ones, and
thus might hinder the ability of poor people to express their religious beliefs
more than rich.4 I would also add that using laws and mandates to control
individual behavior is hard because they are difficult to enforce. Jay also notes
that mandates tend to force practices underground. It is difficult to know what
people are doing inside their homes, or in small groups, and thus it’s hard to stop
them. It seems to me that, though acknowledging that no solution will be perfect,
Jay is suggesting that architectural solutions might be the best approach for
regulating environmentally harmful religious practices. He says, “finding a
technology-based approach will usually be preferable to outright bans.”5
Technology-based approaches are akin to what Lessig refers to as regulation
through architecture. When Lessig talks about architecture as a form of
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Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662-63 (1998).
“[T]he government should be very wary of implementing any regulation meant to protect
the environment that will allow some believers to practice their religion but not others.” JAY
WEXLER, WHEN GOD ISN’T GREEN 102 (2016). Of course, some might argue that this is true
of any neutral law that prohibits certain conduct, and if society has determined that the conduct
is harmful enough to prohibit it, perhaps it shouldn’t matter that some people are affected
more than others.
5 Id. at 139.
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regulation, he uses the word quite broadly in reference to “the physical world as
we find it, even if ‘as we find it’ is simply how it has already been made.”6 The
idea is that that physical features of the built environment constrain our behavior.
Jay’s book provides a number of examples of architectural solutions to the
harmful religious practices that are discussed. These include:
 Building eco-friendly artificial pools in which to immerse Ganesha
idols as a substitute for submerging them in the ocean;
 Promoting the use of natural dyes for use during Holi festival in India
instead of chemical ones;
 Developing green, environmentally-friendly temples and smoke-free
furnaces for burning joss paper in Asia.
While these ideas can help to reduce some of the environmental harms
associated with certain religious practices, there are concerns with these types
of architectural solutions as well. First, do they result in religious practices that
are too sterile, stripped of their vibrancy? And if so, is there a risk that people
will feel like they can’t effectively practice their religion? Or perhaps they will
seek ways to get around the architectural constraints instead.
Second, architectural regulation typically modifies the built environment, and
once constructed, features of the built environment are enduring and hard to
change. Therefore, if a number of green temples,7 artificial pools, and smokefree furnaces are built, but no one is using them, we’re stuck with them until we
tear them down. This, of course, is costly, and results in waste that has to be
disposed of.
And finally, perhaps the greatest concern with architectural forms of
regulation is that, when we seek to change behavior through architecture, it can
backfire. This is because an individual’s behavior can change in ways that we
don’t necessarily expect. This phenomenon is sometimes described as the
“rebound effect.”8 For example, a landlord may install low-flow showerheads to
reduce water usage, but her tenants might just take longer showers.9 Thus,
behavior can counteract the environmental benefits of the architectural solution.
So, we should consider how behaviors might change in the context of religious
practices before installing permanent, expensive architectural fixes to address
these harms.

6

Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach,
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 (1999).
7 Jay noted that one of the green temples he visited seemed to be underused.
8 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Sustainable Consumption, Energy Policy, and Individual
Well-Being, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1521 (2012) (“[W]hen energy use is more efficient,
consumers may increase some of their energy-using activities. For instance, if lighting is very
energy efficient, consumers may be less careful about turning off lights in vacant rooms. Or
they may simply use more lights in order to have a brighter room, negating the energy savings
from the more efficient lighting.”).
9 P.W. Mayer, et al., Residential End Uses of Water, American Waterworks Association
Research Foundation, Denver, CO (1998).
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The second broad issue I want to raise is really a question, which is:
cumulatively, how significant of a contributor to environmental harms are these
religious practices? In the book, Jay states, “when faced with a substantial risk
to the environment and human health, the government has an obligation to
regulate activities to protect its citizens, regardless of the religious motivation of
the activity.”10 So, are the risks that he addresses in the book in fact
“substantial,” and how do we make that determination?
For example, Jay addresses the fact that mercury is used in religious
ceremonies inside some homes. However, “common household products and
toiletries make up approximately 15 percent of the total mercury found in
domestic wastewater.”11 Does the mercury used in religious rituals make up a
greater or smaller percentage? Similarly, I was interested to read about the palms
used in Palm Sunday, but what about palm trees that are destroyed for nonreligious uses, such as oil, and for hearts of palm? Perhaps those activities are
contributing more to the destruction of palm trees and habitats than the religious
practice—and isn’t that relevant when we’re talking about where to focus our
regulatory power?
This doesn’t mean that the religious practices are necessarily insignificant or
unsubstantial, but it does raise questions, including how significant or
substantial they are, how we determine what constitutes a “significant” impact
on the environment, and how we determine where to target our limited
regulatory resources. It seems to me that we must be concerned not only with
determining the most appropriate regulatory tool to control harmful practices,
but also with targeting the most significant behaviors. With respect to the
burning of Joss paper, Jay says that it is “hardly the biggest contributor to air
pollution in the region, but this detail is beside the point.”12 Perhaps it need not
be the biggest contributor, but surely at some point the impact—even the
cumulative impact—is so small as to make it de minimus. So where is that line?
And do we need that type of empirical research before we decide whether and
how to regulate these practices?
The final point I want to mention, briefly, concerns the animal-related
practices that Jay describes in the book. As a professor of animal law and a longtime vegan, I have some concluding thoughts here. There are many examples in
our laws where necessity justifies an action that would otherwise be
impermissible. Similarly, the exact same act could be legal if done for purposes
of ritual slaughter or for food consumption, but illegal if done for fun. This focus
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WEXLER, supra note 4, at 139 (emphasis added).
Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity
in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 563 (2004) (“Other
contributions identified in the AMSA study include infiltration and inflow into the sewer
system, mercury used in religious rituals and folk medicine, and the use of thimerisol, a
preservative, in some vaccines.”) (emphasis added).
12 WEXLER, supra note 4, at 139.
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on the justification rather than the act itself is also something to consider in the
context of Jay’s book.
The book details the practice of mercy release, where people will gather or
purchase large numbers of animals and then release them into the wild,
sometimes into inappropriate habitats. The book also notes that many of the
mercy release animals die in transport. It details the way that birds are kept in
tiny cages, and the way that these releases often harm existing ecosystems. We
come away with the sense that this is a very bad practice, especially when
undertaken on a large scale. Let’s assume that, on a large scale, these harms are
significant. Some might suggest that the practice should be regulated, despite
the fact that we view religion as a core fundamental liberty.13 Is that because
those people devalue religion? Or because the harm to the animals and the
environment outweighs the importance of religion?
Here, I would like to analogize to animals that are raised for food in the United
States. They too are regularly kept in too-small enclosures in facilities that harm
the environment. And yet these practices are allowed to continue. Even if a
religious practice and a food-production practice result in precisely the same
significant harm to the environment, people will likely consider those practices
differently depending on the justification, as well as their own worldview.
Although the use of animals for food goes beyond the scope of Jay’s book, I
believe this comparison gets at a fundamental question the book wants us to
consider: how does a person “rank” these justifications? Why might a person
believe that religion doesn’t justify a certain harm to an animal, but consumption
for food does? Is eating animals more or less of a necessity than using them for
religious practices? And, should we care at all about the reason for the harm, or
should we just look at the harm itself? These are big questions, and I’m glad that
Jay’s book provides us with a vehicle to foster these discussions.
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There is obviously a tension in the law between the importance of religious liberty
(indeed, we sometimes give exemptions to religious groups for what society has deemed to
be harmful conduct) and the importance of the government remaining neutral on religion
when protecting society from harm (see, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).

